RECENT CASES
COPYRIGHT POOLING AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP)
was organized in 1914 to license the public performance for profit of musical
compositions copyrighted by its members. Each member assigned all his nondramatic performing rights to ASCAP, but retained the right to mechanically
record and the right to print, publish, and vend.' The various types of public
performance of music were licensed by ASCAP under blanket licenses covering
the works of all ASCAP members at an annual fee determined by the society.
In return for the rights assigned to ASCAP, members received a share of the
license fees.2 Whereas individual composers had been unable to detect infringement of the public performance rights of their copyrights, ASCAP "policed"
public performances of music and gave infringers the alternative of taking a
blanket license or facing suit for infringement.
After the introduction of motion pictures which had sound recorded on a film
track synchronized with the pictures, ASCAP blanket-licensed theaters for the
public performance of music in this form. At the same time, individual ASCAP
members independently licensed motion picture producers to synchronize (record) desired musical compositions on a film, specifically excepting the right to
publicly perform. The producer, in turn, rented out his film with the provision
that it would be shown only in a theater with an ASCAP license for public performance of music. Eighty per cent of the music on films, some in almost every
production, was copyrighted by ASCAP members. Over 17,000 theaters were
blanket-licensed. The fees were computed according to seating capacity and for
the average neighborhood theater were less than Sioo per year.
Operators of 200 motion picture theaters brought suit under the federal antitrust laws, asserting two claims for relief against ASCAP for violations of Sections i and 2 of the Sherman Act." The federal district court held that ASCAP's
I All are separate exclusive rights in musical compositions granted by the copyright statute.
6i Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C.A. § i (Supp., x948).
2 After expenses were paid, the proceeds were split one-half to publishers and one-half to
composers. Each publisher's share was determined by a board and based upon popularity,
earning capacity, seniority, and the number and quality of the compositions in a publisher
member's catalog. The share of each composer depended upon which of the 19 classifications
he was placed in by a board. The classification depended upon length of membership, quality
of compositions, popularity or vogue, and earning power for the society. Alden-Rochelle,
Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 8o F. Supp. 888, 891 (N.Y.,
1948), modified 8o F. Supp. 900 (N.Y., 1948).
3 26 Stat. 209 §§ 1, 2 (189o), x5 U.S.C.A. §§ i, 2 (1941). The first claim was a private right
of action for treble damages for injury to property or business under 38 Stat. 730 § 4 (1914),
iS U.S.C.A. § 15 (194i). The second was a suit for injunctive relief against threatened loss
or damage under 38 Stat. 73o § 16 (1914), i5 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1941).
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combination of the monopolies of copyrights violated both sections. The elimination of competition among composers in the marketing of their performing
rights, the blanket licensing practice, and the combination of producers and
ASCAP members limiting the exhibition of films to ASCAP-licensed theaters
illegally restrained trade in violation of Section i. ASCAP's monopolistic size
and powe to set prices were in violation of Section 2. Although the plaintiffs
failed to prove they had sustained damages, the court held that ASCAP's power
to fix unfair and exorbitant prices was a constant threat which might cause
loss or damage. An injunction was therefore granted rearranging the disposition of the rights of public performance for profit of music synchronized with
motion picture films. The injunction in effect restrained ASCAP and its members from enforcing the motion picture performing rights of any musical compositions, restrained ASCAP from obtaining these rights, restrained ASCAP
members from refusing to grant these rights to producers when they granted
the synchronization rights, and restrained ASCAP members from licensing
these rights to anyone but producers. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers.4
In an anti-trust case involving copyrights or patents, a court must make an
accommodation between two policies s One policy, embodied in the Sherman
Act, favors competition. The other, embodied in statutes authorized in the
Constitution, grants certain exclusive rights, or limited monopolies, to copyright
and patent holders in order to encourage development of the arts and sciences.
In determining whether the lawful restraints on trade permitted under the copyright statute were overreached so as to violate the general prohibitions of the
Sherman Act, the court here followed the trend, established by the United
4 8o F. Supp. 888, 9oo n. 2 (N.Y., 1948), as amended 8o F. Supp. 9oo, 903 (N.Y., 1948).
Text of the amended injunction follows:
"(a) restraining ASCAP from attempting directly or indirectly to enforce the motion
picture performing rights of any musical composition against anyone as long as ASCAP continues as an illegal combination and monopoly in violation of the anti-trust laws; and restraining ASCAP members, while they continue as members of ASCAP, from attempting
either directly or indirectly to enforce against anyone the motion picture performing rights of
which theyhave granted only the motion picture synchronization rights to the motion picture
producer;
"(b) Restraining ASCAP from obtaining the right of public performance of any musical
composition synchronized with motion picture films when such musical composition is performed publicly for profit in conjunction with the exhibition of such motion picture films;
"(c) Restraining ASCAP's members from refusing to grant to motion picture producers the
right to publicly perform for profit through the exhibition of motion picture film, all musical
compositions which they allow motion picture producers to synchronize with motion picture
film;
"(d) Restraining ASCAP's members from licensing, except to motion picture producers,
the right of public performance for profit through the exhibition of motion picture films, of
musical compositions synchronized with motion picture films;
"(e) Restraining ASCAP and its members from conspiring with motion picture producers for
the purpose of including a clause in contracts issued by producers to exhibitors directly or indirectly requiring exhibitors to obtain a license from ASCAP as a condition to the exhibition
of the licensed pictures."
5 See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308-10 (1948).
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States Supreme Court, toward strict construction of such statutory grants.'
This case represents an extension to the copyright field, of limitations on patent
combinations and licensing practices, and of special penalties imposed for misuse of patents in violation of anti-trust laws. In addition, the case suggests a
further tightening of restrictions on methods which may be lawfully employed
to obtain the reward from either a copyright or patent.
In the formation of ASCAP to maximize the revenue from the performing
rights in their musical compositions, the copyright owners had resorted to one
variety of a device commonly referred to in connection with patent cases as a
pool.7 The pool in this case resulted from the assignment of performing rights
of many individual copyright owners to a central organization which acted as a
common agency for granting blanket licenses for the aggregated copyrights.
Prior cases have developed no simple test for determining whether patent
pools conform to the anti-trust or patent laws. Instead, the few cases in which
pools have been involved seem to indicate that an examination into the reasonableness, market dominance, intent to monopolize, or practices of the combination is necessary to determine legality. Thus, in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana)v.
United States the United States Supreme Court asserted that a cross licensing
pool and division of royalties would be illegal "only when used to effect a monopoly, or to fix prices, or to impose otherwise an unreasonable restraint upon
interstate commerce." 8 Since effective control of the industry, in the view of the
Supreme Court, was not shown in that case, no violation of Section i or 2 of the
Sherman Act was found. Furthermore, in United States v. Vehicular Parking,
while the court found illegal practices, it stated, "Indeed, patent pools per se are
not condemned... except where the conjoint design of persons in such acquisition and pooling is to restrain trade."9 Where related patents on shoe machinery
were found to be noncompeting, their combination in one dominant concern
by a series of mergers of manufacturers in the same industry was held not in
violation of the Sherman Act in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.Y°
And in United States v. GeneralElectric Co.,- the fixing of prices by the licensor
of patented articles manufactured by a single licensee under a license to make
and vend was approved by the Supreme Court, which ignored the existence of a
pool.
6Ibid., at 31o-11; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665
(i944); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942).

7 Generally, any mutual exchange of patent rights or acquisition of such rights from others
has been termed a pool. Oppenheim, Cases on Federal Anti-Trust Laws 553 (1948). "The
words 'patent pool' are not words of art. The expression is used in this opinion to convey the
idea of a linking of the right to use patents issued to more than one patentee." United States
v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 313 n. 24 (1948).
' 283 U.S. 163, 175 (1931).
954 F. Supp. 828,839 (Del., i944), modified 56 F. Supp. 297 (Del., r944), judgment amended 6i F. Supp. 656 (Del., 1945).
247 U.S. 32 (1918); cf. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
2°
272
2
U.S. 476 (1926); cf. Bement v. National Harrow Co., r86 U.S. 70 (1902).
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Cases where patent pools have been condemned have been characterized by
abuses. For example, in Hartford-Empirev. United States" the Court found illegal a pool which had fixed prices and uniform terms for the sale of patented
articles, determined manufacturing conditions and quotas of patented articles,
and fixed prices and allocated production of unpatented articles.3 The General
Electric doctrine has been severely limited by the finding of illegality in United
States v. Line MaterialCo.14 of a licensing arrangement with numerous producers
which fixed the prices of products under licenses to manufacture and sell. Other
abuses which have been considered sufficient to make a patent pool illegal are
the allocation of territories,5 and restraint of competition by price cutting and
6
threats of infringement suits.
The present case makes it clear that a pool which compels licensees to take
blanket licenses or licenses in gross for pooled copyrights violates Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Although this is a copyright case, the rationale could be applied with equal force in the patent field. The holding was foreshadowed by
United States v. ParamountPictures,Inc., 7 where "block booking" of motion
picture films was condemned because it added to the monopoly of a single copyright that of another copyright which must be taken in order to secure the first.
Such enlargement of the legal monopoly was denounced in that case in reliance
on the principle of the patent tie-in cases, which forbids the owner of a patent to
condition its use on the purchase or use of other patented or unpatented materials. It is true that all conditions in patent-licensing agreements are not illegal
per se, according to Transparent-WrapMachine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.,'8
which held a license requiring assignment back to the licensor of improvement
patents not illegal per se. However, in InternationalSalt Co. v. United States'9
386 (1945).
13Other cases in which these abuses were condemned are: United States v. Vehicular
Parking, 54 F. Supp. 828 (Del., 1944), modified 56 F. Supp. 297 (Del., i944), judgment
amended 61 F. Supp. 656 (Del., 1045); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S.
20 (1912); cf. National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 Fed. 36 (C.C.A. 3d, 1897) (pool fixed prices
and conditions of sale for licensees). In all these cases market control had been achieved.
2 323 U.S.

14 333 U.S. 287 (r948).
is United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (N.Y., 1945). The court did not
decide, however, that allocation of territory to a licensee under a patent is illegal if the allocation is simply an attempt to achieve market discrimination in order to exploit the patent and
is not a previously arrived at division of territory among pooling patent holders carried
through by means of patents. As in cases of patented product price-fixing under a license to
manufacture and vend, legality of the practice may depend upon nonexistence of pooling or
the number of licensees.
' 6 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Staley, 42 F. Supp. 14o (Pa., 1941) (motion to dismiss denied).
17334 U.S. 131 (1948).
18329 U.S. 637 (I947). In United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (x948), the
Stokes case was distinguished on the grounds that it applied only to improvement patents. A
further tendency to limit the Stokes rule to cases where market control does not exist may
be seen in United States v. General Electric Co., So F. Supp. 989, 1OO6 (N.Y., 1948).
'9 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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the tying-in of unpatented materials with the license of a patented device was
held to be illegal per se. The practice of blanket licensing similarly ties together
numerous copyrights. The practice has an objectionable result similar to that
in the tie-in of unpatented and patented materials-it tends to exclude copyrighted music of competing nonmembers from the market. 2 In addition, it gives
the tying-in copyright owner an individual reward which need not be based on
the individual merit of the monopoly he has been granted. Therefore, it would
seem that compulsory blanket licensing should also be illegal per se. Such a rule
would eliminate consideration of market control. Since ASCAP possessed market control, it could be said that the present case does not go that far, but the
decision on the illegality of blanket licensing nevertheless was arrived at without apparent reliance on the presence of market control. Whether blanket licensing should be illegal per se where merely optional is a more difficult problem. In the InternationalSalt case and in United Shoe MachineryCorp. v. United
States,21 optionality was not a sufficient justification for a patent tie-in. Yet in
the Paramountcase it was indicated that optional block booking would be lawful.- In the present case, the court ignored the option of "per piece" licensing of
individual compositions afforded by ASCAP. In this case, however, the much
higher cost of "per piece" licensing under the fees set by ASCAP was in effect
a compulsion to use blanket licensing.23 It seems unlikely that such disguised
compulsion would mislead any court into accepting it as a justification. But
even where a bona fide option of individual licensing exists, the mere existence
of this alternative would not dispel all the evil effects of blanket licensing in
cases where it was practiced. It is true that the exclusion of competitors from
the tied-in field may not be so effective in such a case. However, the reward on
each copyright is still not individualized. Furthermore, a preference of a licensee
for blanket licensing in the absence of compulsion would indicate that the practice has some advantage resulting from the combination of copyrights rather
than the merit of the work. Judicial sanction of the practice, consequently,
would encourage other combinations in order to obtain a similar advantage.
Nevertheless, the Paramountcase seems to indicate some hesitancy of the courts
to outlaw blanket licensing, or a tie-in, where it is not compulsory and where in0

20 It has been argued that musical compositions do not compete, but in the field of popular
music at least, the possibilities for substitution are so great as to seem the equivalent of effective competition.

21258 U.S.

451 (1922).

"We do not suggest that films may not be sold in blocks or groups, when there is no
requirement, express or implied, for the purchase of more than one film. All we hold illegal is a
refusal to license one or more copyrights unless another copyright is accepted." United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948).
23 While the price of a blanket license was $ioo per year for the average neighborhood theater, the price of a single "per piece" license was set at $zo. No theater had ever requested one
of the latter. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
8o F. Supp. 888, 893 (N.Y., 1948), modified 8o F. Supp. go (N.Y., 1948).
22
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dividual licensing is offered on equivalent terms, should such a case arise24 A
hesitant court could employ some of the broad language of the Stokes case suggesting that it is permissible to use one legalized monopoly to acquire another
5
legalized monopoly.'
If the blanket licensing practice had not been employed in the present case,
ASCAP probably still would have been illegal, since the decision suggests that a
pool setting up a common agency for coordinated licensing of individual rights
would violate Section i of the Sherman Act. The court stated, "Almost every
part of the ASCAP structure, almost all of ASCAP's activities in licensing motion picture theatres, involve a violation of the anti-trust laws.' ' 26 The combination "restrains competition among the members of ASCAP in marketing the
performing rights of their copyrighted works.'2 7 Furthermore, "[tlhe members
share in the license fees collected through the unlawful combination. By pooling
their rights and pooling the license fees derived therefrom, each in some way
shares in the copyrighted work of the others. This has all the evils of 'block
booking' ... .,28 Instead of condemning the structure of the pool in these vague
terms, the decision by a more precise analysis could have resulted in a holding
that any pool whose structure establishes a cooperative licensing agency is illegal per se even though the individual rights are separately licensed. Such cooperative licensing agency necessarily determines the fees or royalties charged
under licenses issued, as a result of the elimination of individual rate-fixing.
Thus whatever the avowed purpose of such an arrangement, it is inevitably a
horizontal price-fixing agreement among the copyright or patent holders. As
such, it would seem to be dearly illegal per se as a violation of Section i of the
Sherman Act under the rule of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co.,9 unless
some justification is to be found in the copyright or patent grant.30 This would
be true whether or not the prices fixed were reasonable,3' and whether or not
market control had been achieved.. However, in StandardOil Co. (Indiana)v.
24

In such a case it might be possible to distinguish United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United

States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922), and International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).

In the former there was evidence that a lease free from the objectionable conditions was
granted only upon the lessee making an initial payment in cash instead of paying royalties
throughout the term. In the latter, the decision indicates that the lessor merely failed to always insist upon or enforce the objectionable terms. Neither case seems to be entirely free
from compulsion.
2STransparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Co., 329 U.S. 637, 644 (I947).
26Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 8o F.
Supp. 888, 893 (N.Y., 1948), modified 8o F. Supp. goo (N.Y., 1948).

27 Ibid., at 894.
28 Ibid., at 895.
29310 U.S. 1so (I94O).
30That such justification in the copyright grant is extremely limited may be seen from
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 2o8 (i93g), where none was recognized for
setting theater admission prices by lessors of copyright films.
3"United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
"United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. xo (i94o). But cf. Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (cooperative marketing agency held lawful where
market control not found and effect on prices incidental and conjectural).
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United States3"fixing of royalties, anolagous to copyright license-fee fixing, and
sharing of fees by a patent pool where effective industry control was not present,
were specifically permitted. Yet it is submitted that insofar as that case permits
price fixing on the grounds of lack of market control,34 it is contrary to the more
recent Socony-Vacuum decision and therefore not compelling. Furthermore,
nothing in the copyright or patent statutes justifies the owner of one copyright
or patent in fixing license fees for the copyright or patent of another, or determining his own rates by agreement with another.s Practical difficulties of copyright or patent holders in realizing their maximum reward without an otherwise illegal arrangement will not be given consideration by the courts.36 Instead, the trend of recent anti-trust decisions has been to compel copyright and
patent holders to obtain their reward without the aid of combinations with other
holders or licensees.37 In view of this trend and of the Socony-Vacuum case, the
force of the StandardOil of Indianacase, to the extent that it seems to uphold
cooperative reward fixing through the use of a pool, seems to be considerably
impaired.
Where a patent has been used to violate the anti-trust laws, the relief granted
may include an order requiring some form of compulsory licensing, thereby altering the normal rights under a patent grant.38 Application of this power of the
court was extended to the copyright grant in the present case. The injunction
not only prevented ASCAP from licensing producers or theater owners to perform publicly copyrighted music synchronized with motion picture film, but also
prevented individual ASCAP members from splitting the licensing of the performing rights from the licensing of synchronization (recording) rights. This
was done despite the fact that previous decisions had held that the right to
print, publish, and vend, the right to mechanically record, and the right to perform publicly for profit are all separate rights granted by the copyright statute,
which could be licensed separately.39 Had ASCAP never been organized, it
would be difficult to see any violation of the anti-trust laws in the act of an in33 283

U.S. 163 (93i).

34 This

fixing of license fees and royalties is to be distinguished from fixing prices charged
by a licensee under a license to make and vend. Where two or more patentees combine them
and fix prices on all devices produced under any of the patents, the arrangement would be
illegal under the holding of United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
3s Compare Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 3o6 U.S. 208 (1939) (copyright held
no justification for fixing of theater admission prices by lessor of copyrighted films). The Court
there stated: "An agreement illegal because it suppresses competition is not any less so because
the competitive article is copyrighted." Ibid., at 230.
36 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 68x (i944).
37 Ibid.; United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S 436 (i94o).
38 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).

39 Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 157 F. 2d 744 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946), cert. den.
U.S. 809 (947); Jewell-LaSale Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U.S. 202 (1931).
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dividual copyright owner granting a license to producers only for the recording
rights for music to be synchronized on films, and granting a separate license to
theater owners for individual public performances of his composition. In fact it
might be expected that the persons conducting the public performance would
be the ones to obtain a license for the right. As the reason for not permitting
splitting of recording rights from performing rights by individual ASCAP members, the court stated that the illegal conspiracy was based upon this splitting.
To make it impossible for the scheme to continue, it was said to be necessary to
prevent the splitting. But though it is clear that the splitting was necessary for
the existence of ASCAP, no explanation isgiven as to why splitting could not
continue legally with ASCAP not participating. Is splitting illegal for copyright
owners who are not members of ASCAP? It may be that since the court felt
that "per piece" licensing of theaters for the public performance rights to music
synchronized on films was "commercially impractical," enforced dual licensing
of producers was necessary to avoid stalemate. However, if "per piece" licensing
of theaters by individual copyright owners were in fact not feasible, it would
seem that economic self-interest of producers in making it possible for their
films to be shown without musical copyright infringement would impel them to
obtain public performance licenses for the music. The likelihood of such a result is supported by the fact that when producers obtained the rights to synchronize music of nonmembers of ASCAP, they secured the public performance
rights as well. Thus the portion of the injunction under discussion appears to
have gone beyond what was necessary to prevent a violation of the anti-trust

laws.
On the other hand, it could be argued that where the copyright holder splits
off the synchronization from the performance right, he has elected to take his
entire reward on that synchronization right and should not be permitted any
further licensing. Some support for this position may be found in UnitedStates v.
Masonite Corp.40 There the product was manufactured and sold by the patentee,
who could not use the reward theory to justify fixing the sale prices of licensees
to vend, because he had already received his reward on the sale to the licensees.
Splitting off the separate right to license to vend did not in that case give rights
to any additional reward. However, the disposition of the patented article by a
sale makes a much stronger case for the reward having been received than the
present case where the sale is absent and there has been only a license of the
right to synchronize.
Still further alteration of the rights of ASCAP and its members under their
copyrights was brought about by the supplementary opinion and decree in the
present case. Enforcement against any one of the motion picture performing
rights of any musical composition was forbidden to ASCAP so long as it continued as an illegal combination and monopoly, and was forbidden to ASCAP
40316 U.S. 265 (1942)-
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members so long as they remained in the association.41 In addition, the court asserted that even if a member resigned from ASCAP, he should not be able to
enforce his public performance right for music which had been synchronized on
films already produced during the existence of the illegal arrangement, since it
was believed unlikely that any court would lend its process to enable either
ASCAP or its members to profit from what they had already done through their
illegal conspiracy.42 These portions of the decree and the opinion represent an
application to copyrights of two comparatively recent and related doctrines applied where patents have been used to violate the anti-trust laws or otherwise
misuse the patent grant: in an action under the anti-trust laws against the illegal practices, the relief granted may restrain all suits for past infringements
and restrain future infringement suits so long as the violation continues;43 in a
suit for infringement by a patentee who has misused his patent or violated the
anti-trust laws, relief will be denied.44 The result in either case is to render unenforceable the rights granted under the patent statute. In Harford-Empire
Co. v. UnitedStates,45 an example of the former type case, where suit was brought
for relief from violation of the anti-trust laws, the Court refused to confiscate
the patent and compel royalty-free licensing, but it did go so far as to compel
licensing at reasonable rates. While recovery of royalties due for prior use of the
7
patent was restrained,46 amounts already paid in could not be recovered.4 Similarly in the present case without affirmative proof that the performing rights
license payments resulted in damages the court would not permit their recovery
back threefold in a treble damage claim. In Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger,48an example of the second type case, where there was an infringement suit for an injunction and accounting, the doctrine applied was similar to the equitable principle of "unclean hands"; aid was withheld because the plaintiff was using the
right asserted contrary to the public interest. A counterclaim for treble damages
4' The original decree had ordered divestiture of ASCAP's rights and their return to the
owners of the copyrights. Because of the probability of disputes and litigation between copyright owners and others who might claim to be entitled to the performing right, provisions of
the final decree were substituted. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, 8o F. Supp. 888, goo note 2 (N.Y.,I948), modified So F. Supp. goo,
903 (N.Y., 1948).
42 This statement of the court was prompted by a letter from a motion picture producer expressing fear that he would be in an impossible bargaining position with a resigned ASCAP
member.The exhibitor under theinjunction, could not obtain alicense for the performance of
the music on a film, and therefore the producer must, after having already made a huge investment in the film which he could not afford to imperil. Ibid., at 904, 9o5.
43 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Vehicular
Parking, 54 F. Supp. 828 (Del., 1944), modified 56 F. Supp. 297 (x944), judgment amended
61 F. Supp. 656 (Del., 1945).
44 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 66r (I944); Morton Salt
Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 3X4 U.S. 495 (1942).
45323 U.S. 386 (1945).
47Ibid., at 4M.
46 Ibid., at 419.
4'314 U.S. 488 (r942).
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under the anti-trust laws and for an injunction against further threats of in49
fringement suits has been permitted in such a case.
In a number of infringement suits brought by ASCAP members prior to the
present case, the defense that ASCA had violated the anti-trust laws was denied recognition.so However, the theory of the patent infringement cases has
now been extended to copyright infringement cases, as Judge Leibell suggested
it should be, by Witmark and Sons v. Jensen,s xa decision announced subsequent
to the present case. Because of misuse of the copyrights and violation of the
anti-trust laws, an injunction and damages were denied in that case to ASCAP
members against theater owners who had allegedly given public performances
of music on films without a license. The court stated that "public interest transcended the plaintiffs' rights under their copyrights."'s2
The immediate effect of the present decision on ASCAP and the motion picture industry will be to provide what the court referred to as a "simpler and
proper" arrangement whereby producers will deal directly with copyright owners for both synchronization and performing rights without the participation of
ASCAP or theater owners. Since ASCAP had been assigned only public performing rights by its members and consequently did no licensing of synchronization rights, the injunction did not specifically restrain ASCAP from licensing
synchronization rights, but by implication it would be barred from this activity
also.
As a result of the decree, ASCAP will lose an important source of revenue. Income to the members will be decreased insofar as the total license fees which
they can command will be lessened by the loss of their combined bargaining
power and by any revival of competition among them as individuals in marketing their performing rights. There will be a loss also to members on all films already produced during the illegal arrangement because the member copyright
owners will be unable to collect public performance license fees on these, even
from producers. Losses due to unchecked infringements by producers on new
films seem unlikely because of the ease with which such infringements may be
detected under the new arrangement. Producers will be saddled with a new expense, the purchase of performing rights, which the court felt would be passed
along to exhibitors in the form of increased rentals.s3 The injunction in this case,
49Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 3 2o U.S. 66i (1944);M ercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 68o (1944).
soBuck v. Cecere, 45 F. Supp. 441 (N.Y., X942); Buck v. Spanish Gables, 26 F. Supp. 36
(Mass., x938); Buck v. Del Papa, 17 F. Supp. 645 (R.I., i937); Buck v. Hillsgrove Country
Club, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 643 (R.I., 1937); Witmark v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470
(D.C. S.C., 1924); Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276 (D.C. Pa., X922). But cf. Buck v. Gallagher,
36 F. Supp. 405 (Wash., 194o) (violation of anti-trust laws prevented ASCAP from obtaining
injunction restraining enforcement of state statute restricting ASCAP activities).
52Ibid., at 85o.
s, 8o F. Supp. 843 (Minn-, 1948).
completely,
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however, does not forbid ASCAP's functions as a central licensing organization
outside the motion picture industry, nor are there any prohibitions against nation-wide policing to detect infringements.
However, the possibility exists that the traditional form of dealings between
copyright owners and the entire commercial music industry may be upset by
an extension of the condemnation of ASCAP's structure and activities in the
present case to the licensing of musical public performance rights outside the
motion picture industry. The importance of such a possibility is indicated by
the fact that ASCAP in 1945 had licensed over 29,ooo establishments of all
types, including radio stations, hotels, bars, restaurants, and dance halls, as
well as theaters, and had a membership of 1,667 composers and 226 publishers.S4
ASCAP's catalog includes approximately one million compositions s s If such an
extension of the instant decision were made, it is difficult to predict what form
future dealings might take between copyright owners and these other commercial users of music. "Per piece" licensing by an individual composer of each
public performance of his work would encounter a practical drawback in the
cost of processing numerous licenses and keeping track of performances. -6 An
alternative would be combining the licensing of performing rights by an individual copyright owner with the license to mechanically record, as was ordered
in the present case, or with the right to print and publish. Such a solution probably would require some system for keeping separate records and sheet music
which are to be used for actual public performances. Otherwise, either purchasers of records and sheet music for home consumption would have to share
the cost of public performance rights, or else producers of records and sheet
music would have to be content with lower profit margins because of the increased expense of licensing performing rights. Any arrangement under which
ASCAP is excluded probably would cause composers and publishers to lose
some of their income from license fees.57 The primary interest of the copyright
s4The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, The Story of ASCAP
(misc. pamphlet). For general description of ASCAP see Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters
and the Sherman Act, 29 Geo. L.J. 407 (1941).
55Aden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 8o F.
Supp. 888, 893 (N.Y., 1948), modified 8o F. Supp. goo (N.Y., 1948).
6
s The average number of musical compositions used daily in 1939 was 30o for each radio
station and 3o for each ballroom. Note, io Air L. Rev. 2o6, 207 n. 7 (1939). Even for theaters,

"per piece" licensing was found commercially impractical in the present case. Alden-Rochelle,
Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 8o F. Supp. 888, 893 (N.Y.,
1948), modified So F. Supp. 9oo (N.Y., 1948).
S7Before the existence of ASCAP there was no record of any composer obtaining income
from his performing rights. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, op. cit.
supra note 54. Existing $250 minimum infringement damage provisions, however, would prevent a complete return to that situation. 61 Stat. 652 (X947), 17 U.S.C.A. § zoi(b) (Supp.,
1948). License negotiations in 1939 between ASCAP and the National Association of Broadcasters, whose members are among the principal users of music, demonstrate the powerful
efforts which may be exerted to obtain lower license fees. Cohn, op. cit. supra note 54, at
42o; Anti-Ascap Legislation, 9 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 713 (194i).
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laws, however, is not in reward to the copyright owner, but rather in the general benefit derived by the public from the labor of the author or artist.Ss Nevertheless, the problem remains of how great a reward is necessary to induce the
release to the public of the quantity and quality of music desired by it.

RIGHTS OF UNREGISTERED SHAREHOLDERS
The plaintiff, a shareholder in the defendant corporation, filed a derivative
suit requesting that the corporation be enjoined from recognizing an alleged
gift of an option to purchase common stock of the corporation made by the
directors to the corporation's president. At the time of the alleged gift, September 28, 1945, the plaintiff was the owner of shares which were still registered in
the corporation's books in the names of his vendors. However, on January 28,
1946, prior to the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff became an owner of
record. The defendant moved to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff
lacked capacity to maintain a derivative suit because he was not the shareowner of record at the time of the challenged transaction. The defendant relied,
in part, on Section 5IA of the General Corporation Law of Delaware, which
provides that "[fln any derivative suit... it shall be averred ...that the

Complainant was a stockholder of the corporation at the time of the transaction
of which he complains... .",' In denying the defendant's motion, the Delaware
Court of Chancery adopted the view that an equitable owner of stock could
maintain a derivative suit at common law, and that the term "stockholder" as
used in Section iA includes the unregistered owner. Rosenthal v. B~urry Biscuit
Corporation.2
Although the principal case reaches a result which is sound, its analysis of
the practical considerations relevant to a determination of the rights of unregistered shareowners 3 is inadequate. Registration of stock ownership on the
corporate records is designed to protect a corporation from conflicting claims in
its relations with shareholders and to afford it a convenient means for promptly
identifying persons eligible to exercise the rights of shareholders. Hence, a corporation is generally permitted to rely on its books when it must ascertain those
s8 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
xDel. Rev. Code (1935) § 2o83A, as amended by Del. L., c. 157 ('945).
26oA.
2d io6 (Del.Ch., 1948).
3 Unregistered shareholders have been variously designated. They have been classified as
legal owners. Compare O'Connor v. International Silver Co., 68 N.J. Eq. 67, 59 At. 321 (1904),
aff'd 68 N.J. Eq. 68o, 62 Ad. 408 (x9o5). But it has also been stated that while the unregistered
shareowner has legal title as against the transferor, his "... possible legal rights... [as
against the corporation] are of an inchoate'nature." In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 21 A.
2d 697, 7o (Del. Ch., 1941). The unrecorded owner is most frequently designated an equitable
shareholder as in the principal case. However, this designation is somewhat misleading in its
failure to distinguish owners of beneficial interests in stock. As used here, the term "equitable
shareholder" includes both the unregistered owner and the beneficial owner, although the
two classes will be referred to separately when the distinction is of importance.

